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Erotic Entitlements Part I: A Reply to Sex Therapy in 
the Age of Viagra: “Money Can’t Buy Me Love” 
Adrienne D. Davis  
I. 
This is the first of three inquiries into what might be thought of as 
erotic entitlement. It explores the role of the erotic in regulatory and 
distributive regimes.
1
 Conceived as a reply to Susan Stiritz and Susan 
 
 
 Vice Provost; William M. Van Cleve Professor of Law, Washington University. I 
would like to thank Marion Crain and Kim Krawiec for inviting my participation in this 
Symposium. I would also like to thank Jeff Redding, Marc Spindelman, and Rebecca Wanzo 
for thoughtful suggestions and even more thoughtful conversations about this paper. Jessica 
Hille and Bernita Washington both provided excellent research assistance. I especially want to 
thank Susan Appleton and Susan Stiritz for their wonderfully rich and provocative paper, their 
intellectual comradeship, and their friendship. 
 1. My usage may recall for some readers Ratna Kapur‘s term ―erotic justice.‖ In her 
2006 collection of essays, Kapur uses postcolonial feminist methodologies to launch a critique 
of how Western feminism collaborates with law and liberalism. She focuses on ―sexual 
subaltern subjects‖—sex workers, homosexuals, and transnational migrant workers—each of 
whom threatens the hegemonic operation of law and the nation state. By erotic justice, Kapur 
then means to describe both the impossibility of justice for sexual subaltern subjects under the 
conventional liberal rights regime and also to reject the regime‘s underlying norms and 
imperatives in favor of a discursive space ―that would bring erotically stigmatized communities 
. . . into an inclusive conversation.‖ RATNA KAPUR, EROTIC JUSTICE: LAW AND THE NEW 
POLITICS OF POSTCOLONIALISM (2005); see also Ryan Charles Gaglio, Book Note, Ratna 
Kapur’s Erotic Justice: Law and the New Politics of Postcolonialism, 17 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 517, 524 (2005) (praising Kapur‘s ―focus[] on the law as a discursive site of 
conflict,‖ but criticizing her failure ―to offer any sustainable alternative theoretical or political 
way to understand the problems affecting subaltern third-world women and impeding the 
realization of greater justice‖ and suggesting her book would have benefited had she 
―remain[ed] in the realm of politics and law for long[er]‖); Alpana Roy, Erotic Justice: Law and 
the New Politics of Postcolonialism by Ratna Kapur, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 589 (2005) (book 
review) (praising Kapur‘s use of postmodern and postcolonial methodologies to conceptualize 
the ―sexual subaltern subject‖ and counter the ―liberal positivist position‖). 
 Another use of erotic justice comes from Marvin Ellison‘s 1996 monograph on crafting an 
ethics of sexual-wellbeing. MARVIN M. ELLISON, EROTIC JUSTICE: A LIBERATING ETHIC OF 
SEXUALITY (1996). Ellison criticizes conservative ideology for its punitive and repressive 
stance towards sexuality, or what he calls ―erotophobia,‖ which it uses to ―mobilize and also 
distract people from criticizing the capitalist economic system.‖ Id. at 6. While liberalism 
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Appleton‘s provocative and rich essay Sex Therapy in the Age of 
Viagra, it starts by summarizing the innovations of their argument.
2
 It 
next uses their paper to pose some questions. First, in this time of 
contentious feminist, constitutional, and human rights sexual 
discourse, how is the erotic defined? How is the erotic related to and 
distinct from desire, the sexual, and even the pornographic? Second, 
are men‘s and women‘s erotic interests aligned? And relatedly, does 
erotic interest differ according to orientation? Finally, is there a 
―right‖ to an erotic life? If so, how is such an entitlement best 
construed—as right, justice, or capability? This short Essay is the 
first step toward answering these questions, which will be 
subsequently taken up in two forthcoming essays.
3
 
II. 
In Sex Therapy in the Age of Viagra, Susan Stiritz and Susan 
Appleton set out to document the complex set of forces that 
transformed 1960s sex therapy into ―the little blue pill.‖4 Their paper 
offers a sweeping narrative of sexuality that includes critiques of 
medical uses of vibrators in the early twentieth century, comparisons 
between the space race and sexology, and psychoanalysis of the 
 
would seem to be more promising, Ellison faults its juridical vision of power and its underlying 
dichotomies of the public/private and rationality/emotion as inadequate to yielding the robust 
vision of sexual justice he seeks. Like Kapur, Marvin Ellison‘s inquiry into erotic justice is, at 
bottom, a critique of liberalism. However, unlike Kapur, who turns to literary and cultural 
studies to find a discursive erotic justice, Ellison theorizes it from the philosophical perspective 
of sexual well-being. 
 Both of these uses of erotic justice are rich and each, in its own way, substantially advances 
the discourse on erotics and justice. My use of erotic entitlement, however, is quite different. As 
described in Section III, by erotic entitlement I mean to suggest how sexuality might be 
conceived within distributive regimes of justice. 
 2. Susan Ekberg Stiritz & Susan Frelich Appleton, Sex Therapy in the Age of Viagra: 
“Money Can’t Buy Me Love,” 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 363 (2011). 
 3. Adrienne D. Davis, Erotic Entitlements II: The Limits of Market Metaphors: A Review 
Essay of Siobhan Brooks’ Unequal Desires: Race and Erotic Capital in the Stripping Industry, 
31 PACE L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Davis, Erotic Entitlements II] (contending 
genealogy, innovations, and unintended consequences of term ―erotic capital‖); Adrienne D. 
Davis, Erotic Entitlements III: A Reply to Libby Adler’s Gay Rights and Lefts: Rights Critique 
and Distributive Analysis for Real Law Reform, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2011) [hereinafter Davis, Erotic Entitlements III] (showing how black queer theory is consonant 
with legal distributive analyses).  
 4. Stiritz & Appleton, supra note 2, at 417. 
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American imaginary. But at bottom lies the story of how the sex 
therapy developed by William Masters and Virginia Johnson was 
eclipsed by pharmacological approaches to sexual dysfunction. Part 
review essay, part biography, part cultural survey, their article uses a 
recent book on Masters and Johnson as a launching pad to contrast 
the ―cultural moments‖ that gave rise to Masters and Johnson‘s sex 
therapy innovations and, thirty years later, to the rise of Viagra.
5
 In 
the process, Stiritz and Appleton document a fascinating story of one 
―struggle over gendered meanings of sex, intimacy, and power.‖6  
For those for whom Masters and Johnson recall only a vague 
association with sexology, indistinguishable perhaps from Kinsey or 
Hite, Sex Therapy in the Age of Viagra is a wonderful review essay of 
a recent extensive biography of the therapists.
7
 The essay recounts 
how Masters and Johnson‘s behavioral approaches to sexual 
dysfunction displaced the psychoanalytic frameworks that had 
dominated the first half of the twentieth century, which produced a 
much higher cure rate for sexual dysfunction, 80 percent versus 20 
percent. As part of this, Stiritz and Appleton emphasize Masters and 
Johnson‘s rejection of the vaginal orgasm and the therapists‘ 
identification of the clitoris and its role in women‘s ―sexual 
prowess,‖8 which the authors have also explored in other work.9 At 
the same time, Stiritz and Appleton emphasize the parallel story of 
Virginia Johnson herself, lauding the biographer Thomas Maier for 
―detail[ing] for the first time the major role [she] played in the 
founding of contemporary sex therapy.‖10 In this sense, biography 
parallels biology in that women, and their pleasure, frequently 
become invisible. 
However, Stiritz and Appleton mainly use Maier‘s biography to 
sketch how Masters and Johnson‘s therapeutic approaches 
 
 5. Id. at 374–89. 
 6. Id. at 366. 
 7. See THOMAS MAIER, MASTERS OF SEX: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM MASTERS 
AND VIRGINIA JOHNSON, THE COUPLE WHO TAUGHT AMERICA HOW TO LOVE (2009). 
 8. Stiritz & Appleton, supra note 2, at 377. 
 9. See, e.g., Susan Ekberg Stiritz, Cultural Cliteracy: Exposing the Contexts of Women’s 
Not Coming, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 243 (2008); Susan F. Appleton, Toward a 
“Culturally Cliterate” Family Law?, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 267 (2008). 
 10. Stiritz & Appleton, supra note 2, at 367. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
424 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 35:421 
 
 
established a new sexual ―frontier,‖ one that they contrast with our 
subsequent ―age of Viagra.‖11 Stiritz and Appleton explore the 
regulatory and cultural contexts that gave rise to these different 
protocols for treating sexual dysfunction. They speculate that Masters 
and Johnson‘s therapeutic innovations, initiated at Washington 
University‘s School of Medicine, might not have occurred in the 
contemporary regulatory context. Unlike Masters and Johnson‘s era, 
today‘s regulatory climate boasts dramatic restrictions on scholarly 
freedom, ever more complex academic hierarchies, intellectual 
property regimes that are less favorable to individual researchers, and 
increased expectations that faculty seek grants and for-profit 
partnerships, particularly in the sciences and medicine, Masters‘s 
home discipline. Our regulatory context today, though, is a perfect 
breeding ground for pharmacological protocols, such as Viagra, to 
take root and thrive, eclipsing behavioral sex therapy. The cultural 
context, too, has shifted. Against the accessibility of and institutional 
support for Viagra, which is widely prescribed by general 
practitioners and therapists alike and enjoys insurance and Medicaid 
coverage, Stiritz and Appleton contrast the increasing fragility of 
reproductive rights, which allow women to disaggregate reproduction 
from sexual pleasure. They also draw intriguing links to the uneven 
constitutional protection for sex toys, which ―facilitate the clitoral 
stimulation that Masters and Johnson identified as so important for 
women‘s sexual pleasure.‖12  
Most intriguingly, though, Sex Therapy in the Age of Viagra finds 
the seeds of Viagra‘s success in Masters and Johnson‘s own 
discoveries. Masters and Johnson‘s research, Stiritz and Appleton 
contend, spawned two contradictory findings. On the one hand, the 
therapists showed that ―female sexual response was significantly 
more robust and abundant than male sexual capacity,‖ a finding that 
could have created new ―sexual scripts,‖ in which clitoral stimulation 
not only understudied but shared center stage with penetration by the 
fragile and unreliable penis.
13
 But Stiritz and Appleton document 
 
 11. Id. at 363. 
 12. Id. at 387. 
 13. As a reader, I wish Stiritz and Appleton had said more about these new ―scripts‖ and 
how they might challenge gender roles, and perhaps more broadly, the heteronormativity of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/19
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how the therapists fled from their own findings. Masters and Johnson 
instead organized their therapy around the idea of a universal ―human 
sexual response cycle,‖ which continued to privilege penis 
penetration and mandated simultaneous coital orgasm for both 
parties.
14
 Divergences from this cycle were ―not diversity but 
pathology.‖15 Ironically then, Masters and Johnson‘s findings about 
women‘s capacity for protracted sexual pleasure and multiple 
orgasms combined with their insistence on the universal sexual 
response cycle actually fueled the coital imperative, generating new 
norms that penises should match clitorises point for point and remain 
the organ in charge. Stiritz and Appleton note that, by labeling other 
sexual responses as inadequate, the therapists actually further 
normalized heterodyadic, penetrative sex, which in turn, ironically, 
increased men‘s ―performance anxiety.‖16 Enter Viagra, which 
―promised to re-establish the penis as the reliably powerful 
hegemonic sexual organ it had previously been.‖17 Hence, one of the 
contributions of Stiritz and Appleton‘s paper is to reveal how Masters 
and Johnson‘s therapeutic innovations had an internal split, which 
gave rise to a ―clash of standpoints‖ and ―contradictory sex therapies‖ 
based on different gender scripts and sexual politics.
18
  
This then leads to the fascinating concluding section of their 
paper. Sex therapies, they believe, ―reflect[] a normative vision of 
sex,‖ which they explore through three fantasies.19 Fantasy, as 
conventionally understood, ―represents a bridge between reality and 
 
much sex therapy. They explain that despite the emerging understanding of the sexual potential 
of the clitoris, which could have led to all kinds of new ―sexual practices,‖ when sexual 
dysfunction entered the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in 1980, clitorises were ignored. 
Instead, the penis ―remained at the center of approved sexual scripts.‖ Id. at 412–13. 
 14. Id. at 410–12. 
 15. Id. at 412. 
 16. Id. at 407. I use the term heterodyadic to describe the current marital regime, in which 
most states, and the federal government, recognize only marriages among heterosexual couples, 
deeming same-sex and contemporaneous polygamous unions illegitimate. Adrienne D. Davis, 
Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1955 (2010) (contending that, while the analogy between gay marriage and polygamy is 
inapt, polygamy could be effectively regulated, and adapting commercial partnership norms to 
do so).  
 17. Stiritz & Appleton, supra note 2, at 413. 
 18. Id. at 366. 
 19. Id. at 418. 
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something either desired or feared.‖20 Stiritz and Appleton invoke 
collective American fantasies about sex, which they argue ―inspire[] 
. . . public priorities‖ about policies ranging from sex toys to 
insurance coverage to reproductive rights.
21
 Their paper identifies 
three fantasies that shape how we think about sexuality. First, there 
was the sexual fantasy ascendant when Masters and Johnson were 
working.
22
 Stiritz and Appleton refer to this as the ―fusional‖ fantasy 
of sex, which emphasizes how the ―quality of the couple‘s 
relationship play[s] out in their sexual interactions.‖23 In the fusional 
fantasy, couples ―strive for emotional intimacy‖ and ―eternally 
egalitarian love and partnership.‖24 (In fact, the so-called fusional 
fantasy might have been called ―egalitarian‖ or ―mutual.‖ It certainly 
has what they characterize as a fusional component, that is ―hyper-
secure attachment‖ and ―dissolving of personal boundaries,‖ but 
seems to emphasize even more the reciprocal, mutual, relational 
aspects of sex.
25
)  
The other two fantasies, clitoral and phallic, are both about power. 
However they manifest power in opposite ways. The clitoral fantasy 
empowers women in some part as non-reproductive sex that ―does 
not conflict with women‘s autonomy.‖26 But beyond that, the clitoral 
fantasy encourages both, or all, parties, regardless of gender, to 
express themselves and negotiate with others for mutual pleasure and 
joy. With its emphasis on non-procreative sex and individual, but 
non-dominating pleasure, the clitoral fantasy is ―all about self, 
empowerment, acceptance of limitations, and perhaps the joy of 
being recognized by another and having one‘s sexual desires 
validated as legitimate.‖27 In contrast, the phallic fantasy is about 
dominating power, envisioning a hierarchy within sexual coupling in 
which men dominate women. Unlike the clitoral fantasy, the phallic 
 
 20. Id. at 389. 
 21. Id. at 365. 
 22. Id. at 394. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. at 394–95. 
 25. Id. at 394. In fact, they refer to Carol Gilligan‘s work on how gender shapes visions of 
care, interactions, and relationships. See id. at 377. 
 26. Id. at 400. 
 27. Id. at 407.  
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fantasy links sex to power, but in the process arranges not only sex, 
but relationships, hierarchically. It idealizes not just dominance, but 
―exploitation.‖28 It is this fantasy Stiritz and Appleton describe as 
culturally hegemonic. As they noted earlier, Viagra ―triumphs‖ over 
other forms of therapy for sexual dysfunction, including conjoint sex 
therapy.
29
 Similarly, ―[w]hen we connect each type of fantasy to a 
different sex therapy and thus to a different vision of sexual pleasure, 
the triumph of Viagra over conjoint and feminist therapies emerges as 
the triumph of phallic over fusional and clitoral fantasies.‖30 
Although their paper presents these three fantasies descriptively, 
Stiritz and Appleton clearly have a preference. They characterize the 
clitoral fantasy as superior to the other two, describing it as 
psychoanalytically ―mature‖ because of its emphasis on both self-
recognition and negotiation with others.
31
 In contrast, both the 
fusional and phallic fantasies remain developmentally ―immature.‖32 
The fusional fantasy is lacking because of its aspirations for ―perfect 
mutuality uninterrupted by conflict‖ and ―its inability to let go of the 
all-good ideal.‖33 While fusional fantasy may resonate with elements 
of Second-Wave feminism, to Stiritz and Appleton it remains an 
inferior vision of sexual pleasure. 
Particularly in their crosshairs is the phallic fantasy. They 
maintain that ―Viagra has trumped a feminist program that could 
have expanded gender equality by inviting people to engage in 
mutual, communicative, and reciprocal interactions or to accord more 
attention and legitimacy to the clitoris.‖34 Their paper refers to the 
―insidious power of Viagra‖ and indicts the drug for ―[f]ortifying 
phallic power rather than creating equality-producing interpersonal 
 
 28. Id. at 408. 
 29. Id. at 373, 414. 
 30. Id. at 391–92. 
 31. ―Clitoral fantasy eschews the idealization of wordless fusion in favor of a more 
realistic understanding that, when two (or more) individuals engage in a sexual interaction, they 
must negotiate to maximize their pleasure, and they must also accept imperfection.‖ Id. at 400–
01. 
 32. Of the fusional they say, ―[I]ts inability to let go of the all-good ideal marks this 
fantasy as immature.‖ Id. at 400. Similarly, the phallic fantasy ―reflects immaturity under 
Klein‘s approach.‖ Id. at 408. 
 33. Id. at 400. 
 34. Id. at 419. 
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mutuality or celebrating clitoral pleasure.‖35 Squarely in their 
crosshairs is the pharmaceutical industry, which ―opportunistically 
decided to launch the drug as a pharmaceutical sex therapy.‖36 As 
noted above, Stiritz and Appleton join others who have commented 
on how insurance coverage of Viagra but exclusion of birth control 
and sex therapy comprise discrimination. However, beyond that, 
Viagra then ―naturalizes the hierarchy embodied in phallic fantasy.‖37 
Indeed, for Stiritz and Appleton, not only does Viagra trump the 
other fantasies, but it also is emblematic of neoliberalism, with its 
emphasis on the individual and corporate profits.
38
 Finally, Stiritz and 
Appleton contend that Viagra manifests Foucault‘s notion of bio-
power, in which pleasure replaces fear, desire replaces violence, and 
consumption reigns supreme.
39
  
III. 
Sex Therapy in the Age of Viagra is an enticing read. As noted at 
the beginning of this paper, it draws sweeping connections between 
legal regimes and other institutions that regulate seemingly disparate 
areas of our lives. Connecting all of these through the lens of 
sexuality, Stiritz and Appleton make some fascinating and pointed 
observations about collective national fantasies and the gender scripts 
and sexual politics they support and challenge. In the process, their 
article also raises some fascinating questions, which Stiritz and 
Appleton may not have intended or anticipated. It is to these to which 
I will now turn my attention. 
Their paper raises a question that has emerged as central to 
feminism: what is erotic? Stiritz and Appleton reference Audre 
Lorde, whose essay The Uses of the Erotic has emerged as 
foundational in feminist theorizing about sex.
40
 Her phrase, ―The 
 
 35. Id. at 414, 417. 
 36. Id. at 372–73 (emphasis added). 
 37. Id. at 419. 
 38. Id. at 365 (―Our analysis of the triumph of Viagra and its implications for sexual 
relationships turns out to have much in common with critiques of today‘s prevailing neoliberal 
ideology and its implications for increasingly oppressive national and global politics.‖). 
 39. Id. at 417–18. 
 40. AUDRE LORDE, The Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power, in SISTER OUTSIDER: 
ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 53 (1981). 
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erotic is a resource within each of us that lies in a deeply female and 
spiritual plane, firmly rooted in the power of our unexpressed or 
unrecognized feeling,‖41 is widely quoted, including in Sex Therapy 
in the Age of Viagra.
42
 In their own invocation, Stiritz and Appleton 
use Lorde‘s quotation to suggest that her view of the erotic resonates 
with their first fantasy, the fusional view of sex.
43
 Famously, Lorde‘s 
essay bifurcates the erotic from the pornographic, contending that 
―pornography is a direct denial of the power of the erotic, for it 
represents the suppression of true feeling‖ and concluding 
―[p]ornography emphasizes sensation without feeling.‖44 Although 
Lorde‘s essay is recuperative of the erotic, seeking to reclaim and 
redeem it for women as a source of power and knowledge, it remains 
intriguingly abstract.
45
 The erotic is a ―measure between the 
beginnings of our sense self and the chaos of our strongest feelings,‖ 
an ―internal sense of satisfaction,‖ an antidote to ―resignation, 
despair, self-effacement, depression, self-denial.‖46 Yet it has very 
little to say about actual bodies and their (corporeal) pleasures.  
Although The Uses of the Erotic has become a canonical text in 
feminist thought, its foundational role is currently under revision by 
some contemporary black feminist theorists.
47
 In her project using the 
 
 41. Id. at 53. 
 42. Stiritz & Appleton, supra note 2, at 394–95 (quoting Lorde, supra note 40). 
 43. Id.  
The ―deeply female and spiritual plane‖ is the caregiver‘s holding of the infant and 
reflecting back to the child unreserved love and affirmation. While masculinity 
prematurely splits off or limits access to this realm, femininity makes it the source and 
measure of all relational orientation and practices, in turn giving rise to the all-good 
fantasy of eternally egalitarian love and partnership. 
Id. at 395. 
 44. LORDE, supra note 40, at 54. Elsewhere in the essay, Lorde says, ―There are frequent 
attempts to equate pornography and eroticism, two diametrically opposed uses of the sexual.‖ 
Id. at 55. 
 45. In her words, the erotic can be a source of ―power,‖ ―knowledge,‖ and ―information,‖ 
offering ―a well of replenishing and provocative force to the woman who does not fear its 
revelation, nor succumb to the belief that sensation is enough.‖ Id. at 54. 
 46. Id. at 54, 58. 
 47. LaMonda Horton-Stallings, Funky Erotixx 13 (unpublished manuscript on file with 
author) (―[I]t is an introductory document that paralyzes with the enormity of its expectations 
and goals and awes with its discursive touch to symbolize the very thing that it speaks about: 
the erotic.‖). Sharon Holland refers to The Uses of the Erotic as ―the most thoroughgoing 
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musical genre funk to recuperate the black erotic, literary scholar 
LaMonda Horton-Stallings says of Lorde‘s essay: ―I have to 
simultaneously accept its very cogent critique of capitalism, its awe 
of joy and reverence for creativity but refuse the typical ways that 
many feminist critics use the essay as an anti-sex document and 
critique of pornography alone.‖48 She connects Lorde‘s essay to the 
writer‘s later Cancer Journals: ―I believe that reevaluating Uses of 
the Erotic as part of the Cancer Journal conversation enables us all to 
connect the essay to a broader, more introspective use of sexual 
desire, erotica, sexual health and well-being that needs the body as 
much as the spirit.‖49 But Horton-Stallings has a different vision of 
what she calls ―black feminist eroticism.‖50 Claiming that ―black 
erotica is the textual embodiment of funk‖ leads her to question black 
feminist disengagement with the erotic, including Lorde‘s germinal 
essay.
51
  
From its very inception, with the construct of the slave 
narrative genre, African American literary tradition has made 
an effort of writing itself [a]way from the body and eros. In 
proving the humanity of enslaved black people, the slave 
narrative, with few exceptions, came to represent the spiritual 
and intellectual value and worth of Black human beings and 
the sexual and moral depravity of white slave owners. Writers 
spoke of spiritual literacy, intellectual literacy, but never erotic 
literacy. But even the slave narrative contains potential 
moments of erotic literacy that are overwritten with the history 
of racialized sexuality . . . .
52
 
Horton-Stallings tries to recuperate this ―erotic literacy‖ as part of 
black sexuality and the black erotic through the lens of funk, which 
 
(black) feminist engagement with the erotic.‖ SHARON HOLLAND, THE EROTIC LIFE OF RACISM 
(forthcoming 2012). 
 48. Horton-Stallings, supra note 47, at 13.  
 49. Id. at 14. 
 50. Id. at 25. 
 51. Id. at 5. 
 52. Id. at 9. 
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she argues resonates with queer efforts to engage subversive and non-
normative sexualities.
53
  
Literary and cultural theorist Sharon Holland expresses similar 
concerns. In her forthcoming book, The Erotic Life of Racism, 
Holland worries that, as ―one of the most important feminist 
statements in the latter part of the 20th century,‖ Lorde‘s essay 
―places the most visible branch of black feminist thought in direct 
opposition to an emerging sexuality studies.‖54 Connecting Lorde‘s 
essay, first delivered in 1978, to Simone de Beauvoir‘s work thirty 
years earlier, Holland finds that The Uses of the Erotic ―expresses a 
commitment not only to the erotic but also to a gendered erotic; one 
harnessed by and for women.‖55 This is curious, Holland contends, 
because although Lorde might have taken the opportunity to forge 
intellectual and political allegiances between two emerging bodies of 
thought focused on the body, sexuality, and justice—black feminism 
and queer studies—―Lorde‘s piece does the work of moving black 
feminist inquiry away from an understanding of all sexual minorities 
(perverts, prostitutes, pederasts and sex workers) as having a 
collective stake in dismantling the regulatory regime of sex law.‖56 In 
this sense, Lorde and other ―significant and visible black feminists 
 
 53. Id. at 7. 
Once we understand the importance and workings of funk, it would be easy to 
comprehend that the sexual revolution never bypassed blacks and because we continue 
to live with institutional racism, white supremacy, and patriarchy, sexual revolution 
and sexual decolonization of the mind continue even today. Funk was already offering 
what queer studies still struggles to do.  
Id. Funk also shares with queer theory an embrace of the deviant: ―[B]ecause funk can be 
affect, mood, agency, subjectivity, adjective and action, the subjects it produces, freaks and 
aliens, are attempts to create a discourse of human rights, replace the nation and citizen in black 
liberation discourses with a more globally-oriented subject.‖ Id. at 8. 
 54. HOLLAND, supra note 47. 
 55. Id.  
Beauvoir‘s and Lorde‘s work on the erotic is punctuated by what feminists have come 
to think of as essentialist claims about the ―nature‖ of the feminine and female 
experience, although the new renaissance in Beauvoir studies has tried to provide a 
more nuanced understanding of her contributions to feminist inquiry by interrogating 
the charge of essentialism against her. 
Id. 
 56. Id. 
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. . . absented themselves from a somewhat fruitful, if problematic 
debate about how we take our pleasure.‖57  
These emerging black feminist critiques suggest that ―feminist 
erotics‖ remains under construction and revision. While both laud her 
work, Horton-Stallings and Holland still find Lorde‘s essay ―provides 
one of the first black feminist injunctions against the messy 
contemplation of pleasure/desire that queer theory would undertake 
in the next two decades.‖58 Similarly, Mireille Miller-Young 
questions the intellectual merit in ―setting up the pornographic 
outside of productive politics for black women.‖59 Both Horton-
Stallings and Holland call for deeper interlocution between black 
feminist and black queer thought, which also focused on the 
production and regulation of the body and produced an alternative 
theory of the erotic.
60
 Leaving the erotic undefined and vague enables 
a vacuum to emerge, one that can easily be filled by ―erotophobic‖ 
investments.
61
 
Contemplating this question—what is erotic—raises a few 
questions about Stiritz and Appleton‘s own erotic investments. For 
instance, while they clearly intend to be sex positive, endorsing 
sexual pleasure and encouraging the development of ―new sexual 
scripts,‖ this reader detected an undertone of judgment about 
appropriate and inappropriate sources and stimulations for the 
erotic.
62
 At times their paper seems to revert to a dominance analysis 
that is skeptical of heterosexual intercourse.
63
 For instance, they refer 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. E-mail from Mireille Miller-Young, Assistant Professor of Feminist Studies and 
Affiliate Assistant Professor of Black Studies, Univ. of Cal., Santa Barbara, to Adrienne D. 
Davis, Professor of Law, Washington Univ. Sch. of Law (Jan. 6, 2011, 09:50 CST) (on file with 
author); see also Mireille Miller-Young, A Taste for Brown Sugar: Black Women, Sex Work, 
and Pornography (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (destabilizing common 
understandings regarding black women who work in pornography).  
 60. I will be elaborating this connection in a subsequent essay. Davis, Erotic Entitlements 
III, supra note 3.  
 61. Horton-Stallings, supra note 47, at 26. 
 62. In other work, both Stiritz and Appleton have demonstrated their commitment to sex 
positivity. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 9. 
 63.  Dominance analysis was first articulated by legal feminist Catharine MacKinnon.  She 
summarized and rejected both of the primary extant approaches to sex equality: 
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approvingly to an older wife (fifty-one!) who complained that Viagra 
had disrupted the decreasing frequency of sex in her marriage, which 
she had cited as a positive trend.
64
 Similarly, an erection, in their 
language, comprises ―repackaged male dominance‖ and ―male 
supremacy.‖65 References to the ―insidious power of Viagra‖ suggest 
that medically enabled erections, ―without benefit of counseling,‖ are 
 
The philosophy underlying the difference approach is that sex is a difference, a 
division, a distinction, beneath which lies a stratum of human commonality, sameness. 
The moral thrust of the sameness branch of the doctrine is to make normative rules 
conform to this empirical reality by granting women access to what men have access 
to: to the extent that women are no different from men, we deserve what they have. 
The differences branch, which is generally seen as patronizing but necessary to avoid 
absurdity, exists to value or compensate women for what we are or have become 
distinctively as women (by which is meant, unlike men) under existing conditions. 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 33 
(1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON: FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]. In contrast, she contended that:  
Gender is also a question of power, specifically of male supremacy and female 
subordination. The question of equality, from the standpoint of what it is going to take 
to get it, is at root a question of hierarchy, which—as power succeeds in constructing 
social perception and social reality—derivatively becomes a categorical distinction, a 
difference. 
Id. at 40; see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: 
A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 178 (1979) (―[D]ominance and aggressiveness are found to 
characterize the ideal of ‗masculinity‘ in general and in sexual relations. . . . A major 
substantive element in the social meaning of masculinity, what men learn makes them ‗a man,‘ 
is sexual conquest of women; in turn, women‘s femininity is defined in terms of acquiescence 
to male sexual advances.‖); MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra, at 3 (―The social 
relation between the sexes is organized so that men may dominate and women must submit and 
this relation is sexual—in fact, is sex.‖); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST 
THEORY OF THE STATE (1989) (contrasting feminism‘s account of male power through sex with 
Marxism‘s account of class power through labor); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, 
Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 8 SIGNS 532 (1982) (―[W]omen notice 
that sexual harassment looks a great deal like ordinary heterosexual initiation under conditions 
of gender inequality. Few women are in a position to refuse unwanted sexual initiatives. That 
consent rather than nonmutuality is the line between rape and intercourse further exposes the 
inequality in normal social expectations.‖).  
 64. Stiritz & Appleton, supra note 2, at 415. The quotation is: 
So here we are at that stage of our life and . . . as things are quieting down in your life 
and you‘re . . . becoming friends and yes, there‘s a closeness and a friendship and yes 
sex did happen occasionally but quite rarely as you‘re getting older, and to me that 
wasn‘t a major problem . . . and all of a sudden Viagra . . . became a main focus in the 
house . . . . 
Id. (quoting Annie Potts et al., The Downside of Viagra: Women’s Experiences and Concerns, 
25 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 697, 708 (2003)). 
 65. Id. at 417. 
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illegitimate.
66
 Legitimate (sincere?) erections, it seems, must be 
earned, ideally in the context of sex therapy that also instructs in non-
penetration alternatives.  
Relatedly, in one intriguing part of the paper, Stiritz and Appleton 
juxtapose the increasing fragility of women‘s reproductive rights 
against what they characterize as the ―ascendancy of respect for male 
sexual pleasure—most notably a Supreme Court opinion [Lawrence 
v. Texas] idealizing gay male anal sex and its role in fostering 
intimacy.‖67 While I tend to disagree with their characterization of 
Lawrence as ―idealizing‖ gay male anal sex, their underlying 
argument troubles me even more. It leads me to question whether 
Stiritz and Appleton themselves respect male sexual pleasure as a 
legitimate regulatory goal. In fact, claims such as Viagra is ―inimical 
to women‘s interests‖ beg the question: what are women‘s, or 
anyone‘s, erotic interests?68 Are women‘s erotic interests 
conceptually and analytically distinct from men‘s? If so, how do 
men‘s erotic interests figure in Stiritz and Appleton‘s analysis? Their 
indictment of Viagra and their characterization of male sexuality in 
Lawrence lead me to wonder about the scope of their claims and 
commitments. In addition, while calling for new sexual scripts, Stiritz 
and Appleton seem critical of some non-normative enactments. 
Consider their criticism of the phallic fantasy, which they say 
―embodies the thrill of power, but here it is power either 
masochistically or sadistically experienced.‖69 They continue, ―[t]his 
is a sexual fantasy found in hierarchically arranged relationships.‖70 
They thus associate the sexual practice of sadomasochism with 
inequitable relationships. Of course, Stiritz and Appleton‘s 
characterization and critique of sadomasochism will be perplexing to 
many, practitioners of S/M and scholars of sexuality alike. While it 
 
 66. Id. at 413, 417; see also id. at 414 (―While sex therapists who use evidence-based 
practices integrate sex therapy (often for couples) with the use of Viagra, when indicated, to 
treat interpersonal and sexual difficulties holistically, general practitioners, who are a much 
larger group and who treat many more patients, usually dispense Viagra to treat the penis 
alone.‖). 
 67. Id. at 387.  
 68. Id. at 364. 
 69. Id. at 408 (emphasis added). 
 70. Id. (emphasis added). 
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may be true that, as in the phallic fantasy, ―[d]ominance, privilege, 
and power-over constitute the appeal of‖ S/M,71 it does not follow 
that those who practice it engage in the exploitative and hierarchical 
relationships Stiritz and Appleton identify with the phallic fantasy. 
Nor is it clear that practitioners of S/M experience the personal 
disempowerment in work and other aspects of their lives that Stiritz 
and Appleton cite as correlated with inegalitarian/hierarchical sex.
72
 
(To the contrary, many S/M submissives often enjoy immense social 
power, including in their jobs.
73
) Many also would reject the claim 
that S/M, a consensual practice that brings pleasure to both 
dominants and submissives, constitutes ―exploitation.‖74 Finally, I 
resist the association of S/M with all of the negatives Stiritz and 
Appleton attribute to the phallic fantasy: developmental immaturity, 
homophobia, and the perpetuation of ―male sexual dominance,‖ 
―conventional gender hierarchies,‖ and ―harmful myths and 
practices.‖75 
In sum, their perhaps unintended association of S/M with the 
much criticized phallic fantasy suggests Stiritz and Appleton may 
have a circumscribed vision of erotics, albeit one that remains 
undefined. While Sex Therapy in the Age of Viagra and their other 
papers suggest that their vision of the erotic is deeply and sincerely 
rooted in realizing mutually negotiated sexual pleasure, I am curious 
 
 71. Id.  
 72. Stiritz & Appleton, supra note 2, at 401–02.  
So entwined is sexual pleasure with power in other realms, one report suggests that 
women who do not feel entitled to demand equal sexual pleasure from their male 
partners also do not feel entitled to ask for raises at work, while sexually self-confident 
women are much more likely to pursue entitlement on the job, as well as in the 
bedroom. 
Id. 
 73. Relatedly, contrary to Stiritz and Appleton‘s unspoken assumption that the sexual 
submissive is also the less powerful person in the relationship, some theorists contend it is the 
submissive who has the power, at least in the sexual interaction.  
 74. According to Stiritz and Appleton, ―Phallic fantasy idealizes success resulting from 
quest, dominance, and exploitation.‖ Stiritz & Appleton, supra note 2, at 408. 
 75.  See Stiritz & Appleton, supra note 2, at 413 (why phallic fantasy is immature); id.  at 
409 (―Phallic fantasy is homophobia.‖); id. at 413 (―What props up male sexual dominance is 
phallic fantasy . . . .  When these ideals become reality, phallic fantasy consolidates, justifying 
the conventional gender hierarchy it reproduces. Yearning for the gratification that phallic 
fantasy offers makes us fall for products that promise we can attain it and perpetuates harmful 
myths and practices.‖).  
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to know what, exactly, is the relationship between the erotic and the 
egalitarian? Is there room for inegalitarian erotics in their vision?  
There also is a lack of serious consideration of gay male sexuality 
in Stiritz and Appleton‘s otherwise broad-ranging discussion of 
Viagra. This is curious given their call for new sexual scripts. Viagra 
has engendered some intriguing new sexual practices among gay 
men. For instance, some studies suggest that Viagra may encourage 
safer sex practices. A 2009 study of sexually active gay men, none of 
whom experienced medical erectile dysfunction, revealed that a 
number ―described using Viagra to maintain condom use.‖76 Thus, 
this non-medical use of Viagra to assist and maintain erections, the 
use that Stiritz and Appleton criticize, ―reduce[d] performance 
anxiety and assist[ed] their efforts to engage in sex.‖77 One Viagra 
user even proclaimed it, ―a godsend to the gay community.‖78  
A second and quite different Viagra script involves the expanded 
industry of ―gay for pay‖ pornography, in which straight-identified 
men become a part of the gay pornography industry in an explicit and 
celebrated way.
79
 After 1985, the growing gay pornography industry 
―began to attract performers who did not identify as gay or 
homosexual‖ and ―[b]y the mid 1980s, there was active recruiting of 
performers by scouts, photographers and others who work in the gay 
 
 76. Nat‘l Ctr. in HIV Soc. Research, The Use of Viagra by Gay Men: Findings from the 
QUICKIE Project for HIV Educators and Other Health Professionals, UNIV. OF N.S.W., 1 
(2009), http://nchsr.arts.unsw.edu.au/media/File/1_The_use_of_Viagra_by_gay_men.pdf.  
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. At the same time, this and other studies have found that Viagra offsets the erectile 
problems caused by some illicit drugs and excessive alcohol, thereby ―complicat[ing] the 
decisions gay men have to make about sexual safety.‖ Id.; see also Andrea A. Kim et al., 
Increased Risk of HIV and Sexually Transmitted Disease Transmission Among Gay or Bisexual 
Men Who Use Viagra, San Francisco 2000–2001, 16 AIDS 1425 (2002) (study of high-risk 
population found ―a significant relationship between Viagra use and sexual risk behaviors,‖ 
especially when combined with other, illegal drug use); Press Briefing, 2004 National STD 
Prevention Conference, Crystal Methamphetamine Use, Internet and Other Factors Likely 
Fueling Increases In STDs, Risk Behavior Among Gay and Bisexual Men (Mar. 10, 2004), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/stdconference/2004/MediaRelease/Pdf/CrystalMethMSM.pdf 
(―Researchers at the San Francisco Department of Public Health (SFDPH) found that MSM 
[men who sleep with men] who used crystal and Viagra together were 6.1 times more likely to 
be diagnosed with syphilis than those who did not use either drug.‖). 
 79. Jeffrey Escoffier, Gay-for-Pay: Straight Men and the Making of Gay Pornography, 26 
QUALITATIVE SOC. 531 (2003).  
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segment of the industry.‖80 Jeffrey Escoffier has noted some of the 
effects of straight-identified men performing in gay pornography. For 
instance, these straight-identified performers often experiment with 
alternative ―sexual personas‖ that may challenge existing 
heteronormative masculinity.
81
 In addition, because ―gay 
pornography contributes to the education of desire,‖ i.e., it helps 
sexual minorities envision sexual possibility and affirms their sexual 
reality, ―the widespread employment of straight performers in gay 
pornography . . . confer[s] legitimacy on homosexual behavior 
independent of gay identity.‖82 The widespread availability of Viagra 
has made it easier for straight-identified men to participate in gay 
 
 80. Id. at 535. Escoffier cites one director who ―estimates the number of straight men in 
gay pornographic videos to be sixty percent,‖ although Escoffier himself ―suspect[s] that this is 
on the high side.‖ Id. Straight-identified men are drawn to gay pornography for a variety of 
reasons, including economic ones. See, e.g., id. (―One contributing factor is that male 
performers were better paid in the gay pornography industry than in the straight side of the 
business.‖).  
 81.  Id. at 545–46. 
The straight actor‘s development of a porn persona is a means by which heterosexual 
men can organize elements of their biographies, fantasized sexual scripts, and gender 
roles to perform homosexual sex acts and perhaps to achieve a minor sort of 
―celebrity‖ before an audience that is deeply engaged in the sexual significance and 
dramas of masculinity. The persona is, in part, a piece of bravado. Through the porn 
persona, the actor grants himself permission and elaborates the conditions under which 
he agrees to participate in the business. In addition, the persona can be easily parlayed 
into sex work—escorting and dancing—that is often an offshoot of performance in gay 
pornography. 
Id. 
 82. Id. Escoffier elaborates: 
[W]hile every pornographic movie made for a gay male market manifestly performs at 
least two tasks—to sexually stimulate its viewers and, in some way, to affirm their 
sexual identity—it may also perform a third and more contradictory task: to provide 
evidence of homosexuality without identity. It may do so either narratively, through the 
inclusion of scenes portraying straight men having credible sex with gay men, or by 
employing ―known‖ heterosexual (gay-for-pay) performers to credibly represent gay 
male sexuality. 
Id. at 538 (citation omitted). Escoffier notes that  
gay male porn also has a somewhat paradoxical ―hetero/masculinist effect,‖ in which 
the generic conventions that consolidate and reinforce gay male identity coexist with 
frequent representations of ―straight‖ men engaging in homosexual acts. In this way 
gay porn reinforces the incongruity between male homosexual desire—stigmatized, 
abject—and the heterosexual dominance of the masculine regime of desire.  
Id. at 537. 
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porn.
83
 While maintaining an erection is necessary for any male 
performing in mainstream pornography, Escoffier explains their 
particular significance in gay male pornography.
84
 The erection, of 
the top and the bottom, certifies the ―authenticity‖ of the performance 
to an audience that consumes pornography for both stimulation and 
affirmation.
85
 Hence, Viagra allows some straight-identified men to 
participate in gay porn and reliably display the ―authentic‖ signs of 
sexual arousal. 
The role of Viagra in the gay male community seems to be an 
important omission in Sex Therapy in the Age of Viagra. I suspect 
these two examples merely scratch the surface of how Viagra is 
sponsoring sexual innovation in gay male communities. If the idea of 
sexual scripts means ―redefin[ing] sexuality from being the combined 
product of biological drives and social repression into an arena of 
creative social initiative and symbolic action,‖ Viagra‘s complex role 
in both condom use and gay for pay pornography suggests its 
potential to assist in reorganizing sexual behavior.
86
  
The lack of more than passing references to gay sexuality makes 
me curious about the scope of some of Stiritz and Appleton‘s 
claims.
87
 They criticize Viagra for reinforcing the phallic fantasy and 
eclipsing other sexual possibilities in heterosexual intercourse. One 
 
 83. By the same token, Viagra calls into question the ―authenticity‖ of erections in gay, 
and indeed all, pornography. However, Escoffier observes that this authenticity long has been a 
fallacy in pornography, as directors and actors use a variety of aids to sponsor and maintain 
erections, including actors‘ own viewing of pornography, fluffers, and creative editing. Id. at 
547, 550. 
 84. Escoffier rejects the exceptionality of gay for pay pornography, observing that  
all sexual conduct in the video porn industry is to one degree or another an example of 
situational sexuality inasmuch as the performers are often required to engage in sexual 
acts for monetary compensation that they would not otherwise choose to perform and 
with partners for whom they feel no desire. 
Id. at 534. 
 85. ―Without any erections or effective engagement a straight bottom cannot give a 
credible performance.‖ Id. at 547. Gay men, too, performing as bottoms may have difficulty 
maintaining erections. Id. 
 86. Id. at 538 (citing JOHN H. GAGNON & WILLIAM SIMON, SEXUAL CONDUCT: THE 
SOCIAL SOURCES OF HUMAN SEXUALITY (1973)). Of sexual scripts, Escoffier observes, ―Both 
the norms that regulate sexual behavior and the enabling social conditions that elicit and permit 
homosexual conduct from heterosexually-oriented participants can be activated using sexual 
scripts that circulate throughout the culture.‖ Id. at 533. 
 87. See, e.g., Stiritz & Appleton, supra note 2, at 413–14.  
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wonders, though, what the phallic fantasy means in the context of gay 
relationships. Does penetration reinforce gendered iterations of 
power? I could imagine Stiritz and Appleton being of one of two 
minds. On the one hand, they might be concerned that gay men, too, 
valorize penetration to the exclusion of other sexual practices. If so, 
they might prescribe the clitoral fantasy as the antidote in gay sex, as 
well.
88
 Yet, they would quickly run into the problem that, unlike the 
clitoris, stimulating the prostate requires some sort of penetration. On 
the other hand, Stiritz and Appleton might be limiting their critique of 
penetration to penis-in-vagina sex and its role in heterosexual 
dynamics. If so, it would be fascinating to learn how they would 
differentiate the meanings of penetration in different contexts. While 
they acknowledge homophobia, indeed contending that ―[p]hallic 
fantasy is homophobia,‖ there is little discussion of gay men (or 
lesbians) as a positive matter.
89
 Without some reference to gay male 
sexuality, it is difficult to ascertain the limits of the commitments and 
prescriptions of Sex Therapy in the Age of Viagra. 
I do not think that Stiritz and Appleton intend this omission. Both 
have expressed their commitments to broad-ranging sexual pleasure 
and proliferating, fluid sexuality.
90
 Yet Sex Therapy in the Age of 
Viagra seems locked in a dominance framework and a heterosexual 
one at that.
91
 I suspect this is a decidedly unintended effect of their 
 
 88. See, e.g., id. at 400 (―Nor is it even necessarily depicted as partnered sex or 
heterosex.‖). 
 89. For instance, they note: 
While Masters and Johnson never shed their heterosexist assumptions, continuing to 
see penis-in-vagina intercourse as the holy grail of sexual activity, the rise of sex toys 
intended for clitoral stimulation and the celebration of women‘s masturbation have not 
been similarly confined. Often these orgasm-promoting techniques serve as an aid in 
heterosexual relationships, but these techniques also facilitate same-sex and solitary 
pleasures.  
Id. at 406 (footnotes omitted). 
 90. See supra note 9. They also co-teach a course, Regulating Sexuality, that encourages 
this approach. See Syllabus, Susan Ekberg Stiritz & Susan Frelich Appleton, Washington Univ. 
Sch. of Law, Syllabus: Regulating Sex (Jan. 2011) (on file with author); Susan Ekberg Stiritz & 
Susan Frelich Appleton, Sex Ed for Tomorrow‘s Lawyers: Regulation and Revision 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
 91. Catharine MacKinnon, the most brilliant and penetrating progenitor of dominance 
analysis, has made explicit that it is not limited to heterosexual interactions. See, e.g., Catharine 
A. MacKinnon, Brief for the Nat‘l Org. on Male Sexual Victimization, Inc. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), 
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deep engagement with Masters and Johnson‘s therapy innovation. 
Stiritz and Appleton make explicit that Masters and Johnson‘s ―work 
was legitimated by its promise to stabilize marriage and curtail 
divorce. The therapy project, situated in its own cultural context, was 
consciously heterosexual and marital.‖92 Yet, while they are 
cognizant of Masters and Johnson‘s own heterodyadic reality, they do 
not fully gain a critical purchase on it.
93
 Their own paper is 
fundamentally about how the phallic fantasy functions in 
conventional heterosexuality—how its valorization of penetration as 
power subordinates women and denies their sexual pleasure. This 
framework causes them to miss Viagra‘s proliferation in non-
heterosexual communities. It also leads them to be skeptical, in my 
reading, of erections outside of negotiated ―equality-producing 
interpersonal mutuality.‖94 In contrast, their antidote, the clitoral 
fantasy, syncs well with ―a firm principle of Masters and Johnson‘s 
original method of sex therapy, [that] the relationship is the context 
for negotiating pleasurable interaction,‖ and they insist ―this principle 
holds whether the relationship is long-term or fleeting, same-sex or 
different-sex, dyadic or larger.‖95  
This then leads to a final question raised by Stiritz and Appleton‘s 
provocative article: is there an entitlement to non-auto-erotic sex, and 
if so, how would we conceptualize it? What would such an 
entitlement look like in jurisprudential and doctrinal or policy terms? 
Stiritz and Appleton laud Masters and Johnson‘s conjoint model that 
―would eschew treating a body part in isolation and excluding 
consideration of partners‘ experiences and wishes, as most Viagra 
 
reprinted in 8 UCLA WOMEN‘S L.J. 9 (1997) (using a dominance lens to demonstrate how 
same-sex harassment manifests sexual inequality); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Road 
Not Taken: Sex Equality in Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1081, 1089 (2004) (―Because 
heterosexuality‘s inequalities have so largely defined what sex is, sex is routinely gendered 
unequal. Male dominant norms can and do sexualize hierarchy in same-sex as well as non-
same-sex settings, if not always in the same ways.‖). 
 92. Stiritz & Appleton, supra note 2, at 396; see also id. at 395 (―Arising in the era of 
marital/couples therapy and second-wave feminism, Masters and Johnson‘s approach inherited 
and passed on the fantasy of heterosexual complementarity and mutuality, conceptualized by 
one school of feminism and adopted by couples therapy, yet never publically regarded as a 
specifically feminist contribution to therapeutic thought.‖). 
 93.  See supra note 16 (explaining my use of the term heterodyadic).  
 94. Stiritz & Appleton, supra note 2, at 414. 
 95. Id. at 415–16 (footnotes omitted).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/19
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011]  Erotic Entitlements Part I 441 
 
 
prescribing physicians do today.‖96 They similarly quote uncritically 
phrases such as ―you cannot treat the penis separate . . . from the 
relationship.‖97 They criticize Viagra for ―[f]ortifying phallic power 
rather than creating equality-producing interpersonal mutuality or 
celebrating clitoral pleasure seems to be the sex therapy of preference 
in America today.‖98 They likewise indict the drug‘s maker, Pfizer, as 
emblematic of a ―pharmaceutical industry [that] has co-opted sexual 
dysfunction as a medical problem unconnected to interpersonal issues 
and so requiring no more than a prescription.‖99 Sex Therapy in the 
Age of Viagra thus raises the important question: is sexuality a 
meaningful individual capability?  
The disabled community was the first to frame and theorize this 
question.
100
 Rejecting dominant frameworks for theorizing the erotic, 
 
 96. Id. at 414. 
 97. Id. at 415. 
 98. Id. at 414. 
 99. Id. at 370; see also id. at 413–14 (―The 1998 introduction of Viagra has led to over 
thirty-five million men taking some form of an erection-enhancing drug today, most without 
benefit of counseling about other aspects of sexual interactions, including pleasurable 
alternatives to penis-in-vagina intercourse.‖). 
 100. See, e.g., TOM SHAKESPEARE, KATH GILLESPIE-SELLS & DOMINIC DAVIES, THE 
SEXUAL POLITICS OF DISABILITY: UNTOLD DESIRES (1996) (rejecting mainstream institutions‘ 
accounts of disability and sexuality to ―explore the emotional and sexual experiences of 
disabled people . . . relying predominantly on the verbatim accounts of disabled people 
themselves‖); Disability Sexuality Information on Sex and Sexual Issues with Disabilities, 
DISABLED WORLD, http://www.disabled-world.com/disability/sexuality/#ixzz1VAEKozz3%20 
(last visited Aug. 19, 2011) (―People with physical or intellectual disabilities in today‘s society 
are often regarded as non-sexual adults. Sex is very much associated with youth and physical 
attractiveness, and when it is not, is often seen as ‗unseemly.‘ If sex and disability are 
discussed, it is very much in terms of capacity, technique, and fertility—in particular, male 
capacity and technique and female fertility—with no reference to sexual feelings by ignoring 
aspects of sexuality, such as touching, affection, and emotions.‖). I explore the legal 
implications for incorporating disability into erotic justice elsewhere. See Davis, Erotic 
Entitlements II, supra note 3; see also Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s 
Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307 (2009) (identifying the key 
norms that structure intimate discrimination and contrasting how they operate along lines of 
race, homogamy; sex, heterogamy; and disability, desexualization); Michael L. Perlin, 
Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last Frontier?, 20 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517, 520 (1993–94) (―Simply put, the sexuality of persons 
with mental disabilities is one of the most threatening issues confronting clinicians, line 
workers, administrators, advocates, and attorneys who are involved in mental health care related 
work, as well as the families of individuals with mental disabilities. It is ‗a public policy 
question as controversial as they get,‘ since the taboos and stigmas ordinarily associated with 
sexual behavior are inevitably enhanced when juxtaposed with stereotypes about mental 
disability.‖).  
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they called for different conceptions of what might be thought of as 
erotic justice and sexual self-determination. Following their activism 
in other areas of their lives, they called for recognition of their sexual 
rights.
101
 Some activists fought to legitimize and normalize access to 
sex markets and other non-normative sexual experiences. In a recent 
suit in Denmark, a disabled man won a suit ―forcing officials to pay 
his expenses for the services of a call girl.‖102 As Katherine Franke, 
Janet Halley, and other recent legal updates from the Pleasure and 
 
 101. Rejecting both the ―medical tragedy‖ and ―care and compassion‖ models, disability 
rights activists approached the question of sexuality through the ―social oppression‖ lens, 
framing it as a question of rights and justice, not pity or disgust: 
Slogans such as ―Rights not charity‖ and the empowerment evidenced in collective 
action and self-organization enable individuals to move from a negative self-image to 
a positive self-image, to change from self-blame and self-pity to anger and self-
confidence. Given that self-love, confidence and assertiveness are critical elements in a 
successful emotional, sexual and romantic life, then these developments will also 
increasingly impact on disabled people‘s experience of love and relationships. 
SHAKESPEARE ET AL., supra note 100 at 3. For discussion of how others use the term ―erotic 
justice,‖ see supra note 1. For further discussion of how sexuality and disability intersect, see 
Russell P. Shuttleworth, Disability and Sexuality: Toward a Constructionist Focus on Access 
and the Inclusion of Disabled People in the Sexual Rights Movement, in SEXUAL INEQUALITIES 
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 174, 174 (Niels Teunis & Gilbert H. Herdt eds., 2007) (arguing for 
constructionist frameworks that focus on ―the construction of access/obstruction to the 
sociocultural contexts in which desire is evoked and sexual negotiations become possible‖); 
Symposium, Focus on Sexual Access for Disabled People, 22 DISABLED STUD. Q. 2 (2002); 
Symposium, Special Issue: Critical Research and Policy Debates in Disability and Sexuality 
Studies, SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL‘Y, Mar. 2007, at 1. 
 102. Lars Gravesen, Taxpayers Foot Bill for Disabled Danes’ Visits to Prostitutes, 
TELEGRAPH (London), Oct. 2, 2005, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/den 
mark/1499735/Taxpayers-foot-bill-for-disabled-Danes-visits-to-prostitutes.html. Subsequently, 
the Danish government ―launched an information campaign advising the disabled how best to 
go about obtaining erotic services,‖ and the country‘s Ministry of Social Affairs even publishes 
an informative pamphlet ―to inform the disabled of their sexual rights, and encourages their 
carers to contact providers of erotic services.‖ Id. Complicating the matter, The Sexual Politics 
of Disability describes the controversy over disabled people‘s use of sex markets. The authors 
use as an example paid sexual surrogacy, often presented as a sort of sex therapy requiring 
special skills, which may provide ―something of an answer in the short term‖ but also may 
―reinforce[] the medical model of disability and ignores institutional oppression and societal 
barriers, which are the root causes of imposed celibacy.‖ SHAKESPEARE ET AL., supra note 100, 
at 132–33. Scarlet Road, a documentary screened at this year‘s Sydney Film Festival, follows 
an Australian sex worker‘s campaign to both protect the rights of sex workers and advocate for 
disabled people‘s access to sexual interactions and intimacy. See SCARLET ROAD (Paradigm 
Pictures 2011); SCARLET ROAD, http://www.scarletroad.com.au/about/ (last visited June 15, 
2011); see also Documentary news, SBS DOCUMENTARY, http://www.sbs.com.au/documentary/ 
blogs/latest (last visited June 15, 2011). 
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Danger era have contended, so often sex is seen as subordinating 
women, and hence the accompanying ―right‖ is construed as the 
ability to withhold consent.
103
 What about the other side, the right to 
sex?  
I am intrigued by the possibility of construing a right to sex as an 
individual capability. By capability I mean to capture Amartya Sen 
and Martha Nussbaum‘s usage as the distribution of abilities that 
occurs prior to the market‘s distribution of goods.104 The capabilities 
rubric emphasizes not only the absence of formal barriers to 
acquiring goods, but also the presence of the capacity to make use of 
them. It also focuses attention on how a priori social conditions 
shape desires and expectations, thereby influencing reported 
preferences. Sen is famous for reframing famines as a distributive 
failure.
105
 What would it look like to think about sexuality through a 
distributive regime?
106
 What would it mean to envision sexuality as 
an individuality capability that everyone is deserving of?
107
 Would 
 
 103. See, e.g., PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY (Carole S. Vance 
ed., 1984); Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2001); Ian Halley, Queer Theory by Men, 11 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL‘Y 7, 25, 29 (2004). 
 104. AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1999) (examining the foundations 
of welfare economics and calling to replace wealth and utility metrics of human wellbeing with 
a capabilities measure); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE 
CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2000) (arguing that ethics and justice should underpin international 
economic and development policy and that feminism must address the condition of women in 
the Third World); THE QUALITY OF LIFE (Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen, eds., 1993) 
(collection of essays by economists and philosophers integrating concept of quality of life into 
economic and public policy analyses). Stiritz and Appleton make tantalizing gestures in this 
direction. See, e.g., Stiritz & Appleton, supra note 2, at 388.  
 105. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND 
DEPRIVATION (1981). 
 106. I take up this question in Adrienne D. Davis, Bad Girls of Art and Law: Abjection, 
Power, and Sexuality Exceptionalism in (Kara Walker’s) Art and (Janet Halley’s) Law, 23 
YALE J.L & FEMINISM 1, 54 (2011) (urging sex should enjoy ―same distributive inquiry that we 
make with respect to other central capabilities, i.e., literacy, food, health care, shelter‖). 
 107. For instance, according to the World Health Organization, ―[s]exuality is an integral 
part of the personality of everyone: man, woman and child. It is a basic need and an aspect of 
being human that cannot be separated from other aspects of life.‖ PAN AM. HEALTH ORG. & 
WORLD HEALTH ORG., PROMOTION OF SEXUAL HEALTH: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 50 
n.15 (quoting T. LANGFELDT & M. PORTER, WORLD HEALTH ORG., SEXUALITY AND FAMILY 
PLANNING: REPORT OF A CONSULTATION AND RESEARCH FINDINGS (1986)), available at 
http://www.paho.org/english/hcp/hca/promotionsexualhealth.pdf.  
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such an approach provide the requisite jurisprudential grounding for 
―erotic entitlement‖?108  
 
IV. 
 
In the end, my deep-seated appreciation for Sex Therapy in the 
Age of Viagra is two-fold. First, as described in Section II, I am 
grateful to Stiritz and Appleton for introducing Masters and 
Johnson‘s therapy innovations into legal scholarly discourse. 
Likewise, I find their questioning of Viagra‘s effects and their 
contrast between the drug and other forms of sex therapy provocative 
and illuminating. Their invitation to contemplate different sexual 
scripts and how to enable them also has prompted me to think 
differently about the distributive effects of sexual regulation. Second, 
their article raises a fascinating series of questions about erotic 
investments and entitlements. These range from asking what is the 
erotic, to whether men‘s and women‘s erotic interests differ, to 
whether feminists have an interest in men’s erotic pleasure, to 
whether inegalitarian eroticism has any role in feminist theory. Their 
article similarly reminds us how conventional psychoanalysis, and 
sex therapy, may grab hold of our sexual imaginations and constrain 
them such that we miss the enactment of new and subversive sexual 
scripts in non-normative sexual communities. Finally, and perhaps 
most provocatively, their article challenges us to question whether 
our jurisprudence and policy could support an entitlement to an erotic 
life, and whether there would be any merit in doing so.  
 
 108. This is the subject of the next essay in this series. See Davis, Erotic Entitlements II, 
supra note 3. 
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